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Article
Child sexual abuse allegations and
s 60CC(2A): A new era?
Lisa Young,* Sandeep Dhillon† and Laura Groves‡
This article argues that the unacceptable risk test, as applied in cases where
there are allegations of child sexual abuse against a parent, deserves
reconsideration in light of the introduction of s 60CC(2A). The article sets out
briefly the judicial exposition of the ‘unacceptable risk’ test and then provides
a snapshot of the four predominant categories of child sexual abuse cases
that present to family courts and identifies where the application of the
unacceptable risk test presents particular problems. Prior critique of the test
is then considered and it is argued that the test is fundamentally flawed (in
theory) and in practice poses significant dangers for abused children. The
relevant amendments to Pt VII are then outlined and the interpretation of
s 60CC(2A) is discussed, including considering the impact of s 60CG. It is
argued that s 60CC(2A) demands a reconsideration of the unacceptable risk
test in the context of child sexual abuse cases and changes the statutorily
mandated process of decision-making — it should not be ‘business as
usual’.
Introduction
One of the most difficult decisions a family court judge can face is
determining an application for parenting orders where there is an unproven
allegation of child sexual abuse (CSA) against a parent. The paramountcy
principle applies when making any parenting order; consequently, the
overriding consideration is the best interests of the child.1 The case law has
long established the key question in the context of CSA is whether there is an
‘unacceptable risk’ to the child of sexual abuse if an order is made permitting
the child to spend time with that parent: M v M.2
The ‘unacceptable risk’ test has been the subject of rigorous academic and
judicial critique, both as to its content and its application. Notwithstanding
this, in 1996 s 60CG(1)(b) (then s 68K) was added to Pt VII of the Family Law
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1 Under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (FLA) the court can make any parenting order it
considers appropriate (s 65D(1)). The paramount consideration in the exercise of this
discretion is the best interests of the child (s 60CA) and in determining what is best for the
child, the FLA sets out mandatory considerations (s 60CC).
2 (1988) 166 CLR 69; 82 ALR 577; [1988] HCA 68; BC8802632.
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Act 1975 (Cth) (FLA);3 this section relates to protection from family violence,
which includes CSA, and adopts the phrase ‘unacceptable risk’. On 7 June
2012 another important amendment to Pt VII came into force;4 protection of
children from violence and abuse has been legislatively prioritised over the
promotion of meaningful relationships between children and their parents in
determining the best interests of a child: s 60CC(2A). The most recent
amendment only applies to matters filed after 7 June 2012 and to date there
has been little detailed judicial discussion of this provision.5
In this article we consider whether the unacceptable risk test deserves
reconsideration in light of the impact of these statutory amendments, most
particularly the introduction of s 60CC(2A).6 This is a complex and very
important issue, and deserves detailed consideration, not least because of the
documented difficulties in the family law context of decision-making
addressing harm in a ‘shared parenting’ environment. First, the article sets out
briefly the judicial exposition of the ‘unacceptable risk’ test. A snapshot is then
provided of the four predominant categories of CSA cases that present to
family courts7 and we identify where the application of the unacceptable risk
test presents particular problems. Next, we discuss prior critique of the test,
and go on to argue the test is fundamentally flawed (in theory at least) and in
practice poses significant dangers for abused children. We then outline the
relevant amendments to Pt VII and consider how s 60CC(2A) might be
interpreted, including a discussion of the impact of s 60CG. We argue
s 60CC(2A) has the potential to provide a catalyst for a reconsideration of the
unacceptable risk test in the context of CSA cases and changes the statutorily
mandated process of decision-making — it should not be ‘business as usual’.
This discussion necessarily considers the existence, and impact, of widely
held myths as to how the family courts deal with CSA allegations.
The Unacceptable Risk Test: M v M
The unacceptable risk test set out in the High Court case of M v M8 purports
to balance the risk of detriment to a child from sexual abuse against the
possible benefits that child may gain from spending time with the parent
3 Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth). Part VII deals with parenting disputes. All section
references in this article are to the FLA, unless indicated otherwise.
4 Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act (Cth) 2011.
5 We discuss judicial interpretation of this section below. Note at least one judge has taken the
view that, while s 60CC(2A) may not technically apply to a case, the same approach must
nonetheless be applied ‘as a matter of child protection and common sense’: Gabel & Meltzer
[2014] FCCA 604; BC201403680 at [268] per Harman J.
6 Of course, there is no reason why the same issues would not arise where an allegation of
abuse is made against a non-parent, however, the special treatment of parents under the FLA
gives rise to particular issues which are the focus of this article.
7 In this article we will often refer to the ‘family courts’ as in Australia there are a number of
different courts which hear parenting disputes. In the main, however, these courts specialise
in family law matters.
8 (1988) 166 CLR 69; 82 ALR 577; [1988] HCA 68; BC8802632.
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accused of abuse.9 The basic premise of this deceptively simple test is that a
court should not make orders that will expose a child to an ‘unacceptable risk’
of abuse.
In M v M, the evidence included the mother’s claims in relation to what the
4 year old child had said, inconclusive medical evidence and statements made
by the child to a police officer and a child psychologist consistent with sexual
abuse and with the mother’s evidence. The child psychologist formed the view
the child had been abused, although not necessarily by the father. It was
accepted the mother held a genuine belief the child had been sexually abused
by the father; the father denied the allegations. Gun J suspended contact,
considering there was a possibility the father had abused the child and it would
be best for the child to eliminate any future risk. A majority of the Full Family
Court of Australia dismissed the father’s appeal,10 however, Nicholson CJ
dissented on the ground that parent/child contact should not be denied simply
because there was a possibility that time with the father would expose the
child to sexual abuse. His Honour considered there must be ‘a real or
substantial risk of such abuse occurring as a practical reality’.11
The father’s High Court appeal was unanimously dismissed. Importantly,
the High Court rejected the father’s argument that if the court fails to find, on
the balance of probabilities, that a parent has abused a child in the past, then
this is the end of the matter. M v M also indicates that although a finding that
a person has sexually abused the child would strongly suggest a future risk,
such a finding is not a necessary precondition for a finding of unacceptable
risk.12 Furthermore, even though there may be a finding a person has abused
a child, there could also be evidence which would lead the court not to make
a finding of unacceptable risk.13 Fogarty J has summarised the principles that
emerge from M v M as follows:14
1. The decisive issue is and always remains the best interests of that
child.
2. All other issues are subservient.
3. The nature of the risk is best expressed by the term ‘unacceptable
risk’. It is an evaluation of the nature and degree of the risk and
whether, with or without safeguards, it is acceptable.
4. Where past abuse of a child is alleged it is usually neither necessary
nor desirable to reach a definitive conclusion on that issue. Where,
however, that is done the Briginshaw civil standard of proof applies.
9 See the discussion of this case in J Fogarty AM, ‘Unacceptable risk — A return to basics’
(2006) 20 AJFL 249; indeed this is the very heart of the test as expressed by the High Court
(see M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 at 78; 82 ALR 577; [1988] HCA 68; BC8802632). Note the
test has a broader application than child sexual abuse cases; this is discussed below.
10 In the Marriage of PM and KM (1988) 12 Fam LR 249; 93 FLR 72; (1988) FLC 91-958.
11 Ibid at Fam LR 262.
12 M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 at 76–7; 82 ALR 577; [1988] HCA 68; BC8802632.
13 Ibid, at CLR 77; see also the discussion in R Chisholm, ‘Child abuse allegations in family
law cases: A review of the law’ (2011) 25 AJFL 1 at 4.
14 Fogarty, above n 9, at 255–6.
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5. The circumstance, if it be so, that the allegation of past abuse is not
proved in accordance with Briginshaw, does not impede reliance
upon those circumstances in determining whether there is an
unacceptable risk.
6. The concentration in these cases should normally be upon the
question whether there is an unacceptable risk to the child.
7. The onus of proof in reaching that conclusion is the ordinary civil
standard.
8. But the components which go to make up that conclusion need not
each be established on the balance of probabilities. The court may
reach a conclusion of unacceptable risk from the accumulation of
factors, none or some only of which, are proved to that standard.
The test in Briginshaw is now set out in s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995
(Cth), which requires the court to take into account, among other things, the
‘gravity of the matters alleged’.15 The effect is that the standard of proof in
relation to the finding of past abuse is at the high end of the civil scale; this
is crucial if, as we later suggest, a finding as to whether a risk is unacceptable
is in practice often determined by whether there is a finding of past abuse.
In In the Marriage of N and S,16 Fogarty J posed a number of questions
which his Honour said provide a structure or framework for assessing whether
there is an unacceptable risk of abuse:
What is the nature of the events alleged to have taken place? Who has made the
allegations? To whom have the allegations been made? What level of detail do they
involve? Over what period of time have the allegations been made? Over what
period of time are the events alleged to have occurred? What are the effects exhibited
by the child? What is the basis of the allegations? Are the allegations reasonably
based? Are the allegations genuinely believed by the person making them? What
expert evidence has been provided? Are there satisfactory explanations of the
allegations apart from sexual abuse? What are the likely future effects on the child?17
These questions are frequently utilised by decision-makers.18
While some commentary suggests the unacceptable risk test only applies
when a finding cannot be made either way as to the happening of the alleged
abuse,19 that is not consistent with the clear words of M v M.20 It should also
be noted that the unacceptable risk formulation is applied, though not
universally, to cases that do not involve CSA allegations.21 In Johnson v
15 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140(2).
16 (1995) 19 Fam LR 837; 129 FLR 243; (1996) FLC 92-655.
17 Ibid, at [139]; approved by the Full Court in W and W (Abuse allegations: unacceptable
risk) (2005) 34 Fam LR 129; (2005) FLC 93-235; [2005] FamCA 892.
18 For recent examples see Manziati v Manziati [2011] FamCA 277; BC201150348; Langmeil
v Grange (No 4) [2011] FamCA 605; BC201150441 and Wetherill v Finchley [2013] FCCA
1197; BC201312684.
19 See, eg, the discussion of this topic by Justice Faulks in ‘Justice and the protection of
children’, in A Hayes and D Higgins (Eds), Family, policy and the law: Selected essays on
contemporary issues for Australia, at <http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fpl/fpl16.html>
accessed (4 December 2014). See also B Fehlberg, R Kaspiew, J Millbank, F Kelly and
J Behrens, Australian Family Law: The contemporary context, 2nd ed, Oxford University
Press, 2015, at [8.4.1.3.5].
20 M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; 82 ALR 577; [1988] HCA 68; BC8802632 at p 77.
21 See A v A [1998] FLC 92-800; 22 FamLR 756 at [3.15].
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Page,22 the Full Court said the test also applies to allegations of ‘serious
abuse’ of the child, and when ‘it is asserted there is an unacceptable risk of
harm to the child if the child spends time with a parent’.23 The High Court in
M v M framed its test in terms of sexual abuse, however, this was in the
context of determining what level of risk, more generally, was such that a
parent would be denied access to their child.24 Moreover, as is discussed later,
s 60CG requires that decision-makers ensure, to the extent possible, that
parenting orders do not expose any person to ‘an unacceptable risk’ of family
violence. However, not all cases involving allegations of violence, or even
serious violence, overtly refer to this phrase.25 In this article, we focus
specifically on CSA cases, where the ‘test’ is routinely applied.26
Predominant factual matrices
By their very nature, disputes involving allegations of parental CSA are
destined to be overrepresented in the population of cases that require judicial
determination. A very common feature of such cases is that the parent making
the allegation (or bringing forward an allegation by a child) seeks an order that
the other parent’s contact with the child be suspended or supervised. With
such high stakes, and given neither guilty nor innocent parents are likely to
concede the matter, compromise is difficult to achieve. However, not every
case involving an allegation of parental CSA presents the same degree of
difficulty for a decision-maker. While all cases are different, these cases
naturally fall into a number of distinct factual matrices. As we shall see, M v
M fell into the category of case that presents the most difficulty for
decision-makers;27 though somewhat trite, we might ask ourselves whether
‘hard cases make bad law’.
Substantial evidence of past sexual abuse of the child
As Carmody J said, ‘[p]ositive findings of sexual abuse are uncommonly rare
in family proceedings’.28 It is notoriously difficult to prove child sexual
assault. Medical evidence may be inconclusive29 (and may fail to identify an
abuser), children can be reluctant to disclose,30 their statements may lack
22 (2007) FLC 93-344; (2007) FLC 93-344; [2007] FamCA 1235 .
23 Ibid, at [62]. See, eg, for Akston & Boyle (2010) FLC 93-436; [2010] FamCAFC 56;
BC201050409.
24 Ibid, at [25].
25 For a recent example see Fern & Lumsden [2014] FamCA 7; BC201451260. For further
discussion of this, see Simmons & Kingsley [2014] FamCAFC 47; BC201451112, discussed
later in this article.
26 There are some instances in the past where cases involving CSA allegations have not applied
this test: see R Carson, ‘Supervised Contact: A Study of Current Trends and Emerging
Tensions since the Introduction of the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth)’, unpublished
PhD thesis, December 2011, p 160.
27 See the High Court’s comment to this effect in M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; 82 ALR 577;
[1988] HCA 68; BC8802632 at p 77.
28 Murphy & Murphy [2007] FamCA 795; BC200750675 at [210].
29 It is not uncommon for medical evidence to leave open a finding of sexual abuse, but also
to be consistent with other possibilities. Moreover, it will not establish the perpetrator, unless
there is DNA evidence.
30 L Malloy, S Brubacher and M Lamb, ‘Expected consequences of disclosure revealed in
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contextual detail and be viewed with more scepticism than those of adults,31
abused children may recant confessions,32 appear keen to have contact even
with an abusive parent, and there are rarely any witnesses. Moreover, where
disclosure is made to a trusted adult, which might well be a primary carer
mother in a separated family, the mother faces being seen to have a vested
interest in bringing forward a disclosure as a basis for curtailing contact.33 As
one would expect, where there is significant evidence of sexual abuse by a
parent the case is unlikely to result in a trial; certainly few such cases are
reported.34 However, there are some cases that end in trial where the evidence
by an older child is very compelling35 or there is sufficient corroboration of the
evidence.36 In such a case, a finding of abuse may well eventuate and it is not
difficult for the conclusion to be reached that there is an unacceptable risk of
abuse and suspended contact may well follow.37
Substantial evidence of ‘external’ risk factors
In a few cases, there is evidence that points towards the potential for a parent
to be an abuser, though there is no specific allegation in relation to the children
of the parents. In Nikolakis v Nikolakis38 the allegations were that the father
investigative interviews with suspected victims of child sexual abuse’ (2011) 15(1) Applied
Developmental Science 8; L Malloy, D Lyon and J Quas, ‘Filial Dependency and
Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (2007) 46(2) Journal of the American
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 162.
31 J Myers, ‘New era of skepticism regarding children’s credibility’ (1995) 1(2) Psychology,
Public Policy, and Law 387.
32 K London, K, M Bruck, M, S Ceci and D Shuman, ‘Disclosure of child sexual abuse: What
does the research tell us about the ways that children tell?’ (2005) 11(1) Psychology, Public
Policy and Law 194; I Hershkowitz, O Lanes and M Lamb, ‘Exploring the disclosure of
child sexual abuse with alleged victims and their parents’ (2007) 31 Child Abuse & Neglect
111.
33 That this is so, is emphasised by the comments of Kent J in Thistle & Thistle (No 2) [2014]
FamCA 67 at [7], who identified one ‘troubling’ feature of the case being the fact that the
allegation of abuse by the child was made before there was ‘anything untoward in the
relationship as between the Mother and Father . . .’. For a recent article emphasising this
issue, see D Fryer, ‘False allegations in family law proceedings: Using the Family Court as
a sword, not a shield’ (2013) 3 Fam L Rev 137.
34 For a recent example, see Auburton & McGuiness [2013] FamCA 492; here the father had
been convicted of sexually abusing one of the children, another child of the mother and
accessing child pornography. The mother was given sole ESPR with no order for contact; the
father was also restrained from initiating contact with the children. See also Fadel & Jarrah
[2014] FamCA 85; BC201451143.
35 See, eg, Hassam & Hassam [2014] FamCA 7; BC20145126059. The child was 10 at the
time of trial and had made repeated, consistent and detailed disclosures of sexual abuse by
the father to various professionals, in addition to the mother. No contact was ordered.
36 See, eg, Akif v Ahmadi [2011] FamCA 958; BC201150766 (the corroboration was referred
to as ‘indirect’ in this case, at [76]) and El Kazemde & Hanif [2013] FamCA 197;
BC201350205 respectively. For a decision where the judge was asked to make consent
orders permitting only supervised contact in circumstances where a child had made
disclosures about the father prior to parental separation, see Thistle & Thistle (No 2) [2014]
FamCA 67.
37 This was the outcome in the first two cases referred to in n 36; in the third the mother
consented to supervised contact.
38 [2010] FamCAFC 52; BC201050147. See also Tate v Ralph [2012] FMCAfam 279;
BC201202947 where a father convicted of six counts of indecent acts with a child under the
age of 16 and two counts of indecent assault, was denied contact with his 5 year old son.
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had engaged in ‘“predatory sexual behaviour” with other children’39 and
accordingly the parties’ children were at risk of similar abuse if they spent
unsupervised time with the father. The father was accused on two separate
occasions of drugging and sexually assaulting children in his care. The father
was charged in relation to one incident and later convicted of indecent assault
of a child under the age of 10 though this was overturned on appeal. The trial
judge concluded that the evidence of those two incidents alone fell short of
satisfying the court to the requisite standard that the father posed an
unacceptable risk of abuse to the children. However, prior to the parties’
separation the children were aware the father was having an affair; the father
instructed them not to tell their mother, and they complied. The trial judge
cited evidence from an expert witness that, given the children’s silence on this
issue, the children may not disclose to the mother if they were sexually abused
by the father in the future. Referring to M v M, the trial judge concluded that
in combination the evidence satisfied the court to the requisite standard that
there was an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse of the children if they were to
spend unsupervised time with the father in the future.40 The court did not have
any confidence that the children could confide in their mother if they felt
uncomfortable about the father’s conduct towards them which in most cases
would likely minimise the risk of inappropriate conduct occurring or
reoccurring.41 This shifted the balance in favour of finding there was an
unacceptable risk of sexual abuse by the father. The father’s appeal was
unsuccessful, the Full Court acknowledging that external risk factors might
well lead to a finding of an unacceptable risk of abuse.
Of course, external risk factors may also weigh in combination with
evidence of the sexual abuse of the child of the parents (in circumstances
where that alone would not suffice) to give rise to a finding of an unacceptable
risk. This was the finding of Austin J in Hasset v Weader42 where quite
Bender FM held that the father’s alleged history of abuse of family members over the years
and his denial of such abuse despite the convictions meant that he presented an unacceptable
risk of abuse towards the child. Supervised time was refused in part because it was found
such an order would cause stress and anxiety for the mother which would in turn impact on
the child. In Jenkins v McInnes [2012] FMCAfam 477; BC201204846 there was evidence
the father had sexually abused his daughter from a previous relationship; the father did not
challenge the allegations. The father sought supervised contact with the 13 year old male
child in this case; the mother sought no contact. It was held that due to the past allegations
of sexual abuse and the father’s failure to complete any offender programs, there was an
unacceptable risk of sexual abuse and supervised time was ordered. See also Boccard v
Boccard [2013] FamCA 63 (no contact); Staker v Temay [2013] FMCAfam190 (no contact).
39 [2010] FamCAFC 52; BC201050147 at [18].
40 Ibid, at [26].
41 There is a disturbing tendency of some decision-makers to weigh into the mix the possibility
that a child will exhibit protective behaviours and so reduce the chances of abuse. Note the
Full Court’s comments at [95] in this case. For another example see Kerrison v Kerrison
[2013] FamCa 31 at [122] and [126] and the comments of the trial judge recited at [62] in
Partington & Cade (No 2) (2009) 42 Fam LR 401; (2009) FLC 93-422; [2009] FamCAFC
230; BC200951133. While the logic of this argument is obvious (given one is talking about
risk), one would have thought that, if a child is having to engage in protective behaviours
against a predatory parent, then that parent is a danger to that child, at least unsupervised.
Nor is that parent exhibiting a proper attitude towards parenting. This arguably evidences a
higher priority being placed on parent/child contact than protection from abuse.
42 [2011] FamCA 319; BC201150897 at [96]ff.
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compelling disclosures by a young child were not sufficient on their own, but
when weighed together with the father’s abuse of alcohol led to an overall
finding of an unacceptable risk of harm to the child.43
Insubstantial evidence of sexual abuse of the child
In some cases a parent — more usually a mother44 — will hold a strong
conviction that a child has been abused by the other parent, but the supporting
evidence is weak.45 In such cases, even if the belief is found to be genuinely
held, this conviction may be found to be ‘unreasonable’ on the part of the
mother.46 If the court finds the mother is unlikely to change her attitude and
beliefs concerning the father (whether because she is unwilling or unable to do
so) and considers this will impact on the time the child spends with the father,
the court may well find no unacceptable risk of abuse by the father exists and
even place the child in the father’s care.47
43 See also Oscar & Austen [2012] FamCA 220; BC201250292; Oscar & Delware [2012]
FamCA 211; BC201250293; Lett & Lett [2014] FamCA 529; BC201451489 though it is
difficult to ascertain the weight attributed to the factors weighed in combination with the
evidence of abuse (in this case a history of excessive drug use and current adverse
psychiatric findings).
44 It is to be expected that mothers feature more in this role, given their greater societal role as
primary caregivers to children both in intact and separated families. For an example
involving a father in this role, see Farrelly v Kaling [2012] FMCAfam 210; BC201204340
where the father argued that the child’s mother posed an unacceptable risk of CSA towards
the parties’ 4 year old son. The father alleged the child had made numerous allegations
against the mother. However, in this case Willis FM found the allegations were unfounded
and that the father had groomed the child and recorded him. It was ordered that child live
primarily with his mother and that she have sole parental responsibility and that the child
spend limited (unsupervised) time with his father. See also Wetherill & Finchley [2013]
FCCA 1197; BC201312684 though the father in this case accepted the mother’s behaviour
was not intended to be abusive but rather was a result of her cultural beliefs. See also Lacky
& Mae [2013] FMCAfam 284. See also Carden & Hillard [2014] FamCA 43;
BC2014513138; BC201451391 where a father found to have deliberately coached the
children to make false allegations of sexual abuse against the mother was permitted only
supervised contact with his children. Note, the fact that fathers are far more likely than
mothers to sexually abuse their children would also contribute to women more commonly
finding themselves in the situation of being concerned, but unable to prove, sexual abuse:
see K Richards, ‘Misconceptions about child sex offenders’, Australian Institute of
Criminology, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No 429 September 2011.
45 See, eg, Northcote v Northcote [2012] FMCAfam 82; BC201205098; Fielding v Mason
[2011] FMCAfam 1137; BC201110900; Gennaro v Giavana [2011] FamCA 910;
BC201150768; Jets v Maker (No 2) [2011] FMCAfam 1473; BC201110770; Biggins v
Brown [2011] FamCA 1027; BC201150783; Houston v Houston [2011] FamCAFC 178;
BC201150540; Tripp v Tripp [2011] FamCA 598; BC201150529. However, note Gaylard v
Cain [2012] FMCAfam 501; BC201203671 where despite the mother holding an
implacable, but unsupported belief in abuse, no order for time with the father was made.
46 Meinhardt v Santos [2012] FamCA 255; BC201250340; Northcote v Northcote [2012]
FMCAfam 82; BC201205098; Fielding v Mason [2011] FMCAfam 1137; BC201110900;
Jets v Maker (No 2) [2011] FMCAfam 1473; BC201110770; Biggins v Brown [2011]
FamCA 1027; BC201150783; Houston v Housoen [2011] FamCAFC 178; BC201150540;
Smeeden v Wulandri [2011] FamCA 619; BC201150538; Tripp v Tripp [2011] FamCA 598;
BC201150529.
47 Steel v Galloway [2012] FamCAFC 25; BC201250073; Krach v Krach [2009] FamCA 507;
BC200950413; Dalziel v Belladonna [2009] FamCA 254; Mackillop v Jell [2009] FamCA
191; Stapleton v Hayes [2009] FamCA 437; BC200950336; Jets v Maker (No 2) [2011]
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Moreover, if a mother is considered to be an anxious and overprotective
parent, to have fabricated or significantly exaggerated the evidence of abuse,48
or otherwise to be imparting her view that the child was sexually abused onto
the child, the court may conclude the mother poses an unacceptable risk of
psychological harm towards the child. Then, not only may the child be placed
in the father’s care, but the mother may only be permitted supervised time
with the child.49
In Steel v Galloway,50 the mother, along with the father’s brother and his
wife, alleged the child had been sexually abused by the father. The child
demonstrated aggressive behaviour towards other children and also exhibited
signs of sexualised behaviour. However, the expert psychologist51 concluded
that ‘the child demonstrated a secure attachment with the father and an
FMCAfam 1473; BC201110770; Biggins v Brown [2011] FamCA 1027; BC201150783;
Matthews v Bender (No 2) [2013] FamCA 740; BC201352519; Kelso & Finch (No 2) [2013]
FamCA 875 (the mother here had dropped the allegation at trial); Howard & Lipschitz
[2014] FamCA 272; Capetto v Capetto (No 3) [2011] FamCA 345; Ganley & Ganley [2009]
FamCA 641; BC200950539; Lindsay v Baker [2010] FamCA 421; BC201050492 (note in a
later appeal, after care was in fact reversed to the father, the Family Consultant and ICL
recommended only four periods of supervised contact per year with the mother, which
suggestion was rejected by the father as inadequate: see the discussion in Lindsay v Baker
[2012] FamCAFC 189; BC201250689 at [30]). Not all cases see care reversed of course, eg,
Welchman-Rudie & Zawada [2013] FamCA 862 and Fulton & Packer [2013] FamCA 555.
Note Elrasheed v McGrieve [2014] FamCA 11; BC201451263 where Forrest J, though
finding no basis in the mother’s claims, left the child in the mother’s care (the father’s
behaviour did warrant some concern though apparently not sufficient to interfere with
contact with his child), with a quick move to a ‘normal’ contact regime. His Honour seemed
satisfied the mother would comply, though there was a notable caution in the judgment that
her future primary care of the child could be compromised were she to persist with her
claims: at [146].
48 Grandhouse v Grandhouse [2012] FamCAFC 13; BC201250039; Wylie v Wylie [2011]
FMCAfam 1344; BC201110169; Biggins v Brown [2011] FamCA 1027; BC201150783; Jets
v Maker (No 2) [2011] FMCAfam 1473; BC201110770; Howard & Lipschitz [2013] FamCA
75; BC201350126; Ruth (aka Hutton) and Hutton (2011) 45 Fam LR 399; [2011] FamCAFC
99; BC201150259.
49 Langmeil v Grange (No 4) [2011] FamCA 605; BC201150441 (note the unsuccessful appeal
by the mother, who was unrepresented, in this matter: Langmeil v Grange [2012] FamCAFC
39; BC201250129); Steel v Galloway [2012] FamCAFC 25; BC201250073; Manziati v
Manziati [2011] FamCA 277; BC201150348; Muldoon v Channing [2012] FMCAfam 161;
BC201201994; Howard & Lipschitz [2013] FamCA 75; BC201350126; Ruth (aka Hutton )
and Hutton (2011) 45 Fam LR 399; [2011] FamCAFC 99; BC201150259. In Carpenter &
Carpenter (No 2) [2012] FamCA 1005; BC201250758 care was reversed in favour of the
father however the mother was given substantial unsupervised time with the children despite
adverse findings about the mother’s truthfulness as to the sexual abuse allegations (the
mother’s appeal was dismissed: Carpenter & Carpenter [2014] FamCAFC 100;
BC201451247.
50 [2012] FamCAFC 25; BC201250073.
51 Psychiatrists or child psychologists may be appointed in parenting disputes, under Pt 15.5 of
the Family Law Rules 2004. Experts are to be appointed only where it is reasonably
necessary to resolve significant issues before the court: r 15.42. The parties may agree to
jointly appoint a single expert and may tender a report or adduce evidence from a single
expert without leave of the court: r 15.44 It is important to note that the primary duties of
the single expert are owed to the court, rather than to the parties: Divs 15.5.2 and 15.5.5. It
is also possible for the court to appoint a single expert, either on application by one of the
parties or on its own motion: r 15.45
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insecure and anxious attachment to the mother’.52 Further, the trial judge
considered the uncle and his wife were all but personally obsessed with sexual
abuse. Relying on the expert’s conclusions the trial judge ordered care be
reversed, the child live with the father and spend supervised time with the
mother, with provision for the mother to have unsupervised time after a year.
This was primarily due to the mother’s potentially adverse psychological
impact on the child as it was found to be unlikely the mother could change her
views on the question of CSA.53 In Grandhouse v Grandhouse,54 the mother
held a strong belief the father had sexually and physically abused the child. Le
Poer Trench J found the mother had fabricated and significantly exaggerated
the evidence. Orders were made that the child live with the father and spend
supervised time with the mother.
Of course, whether evidence of abuse is substantial or not is a matter of
interpretation for the judicial officer. In Kirby & Holmes,55 the child was
alleged to have made graphic disclosures to the mother, some of which were
repeated to a number of third party professionals, and the father agreed the
child had exhibited some of the less extreme behaviours alleged by the
mother. However, external investigation concluded there was insufficient
evidence to establish any risk of abuse. In this case, Tree J left the child in the
mother’s primary care, set up a contact regime and ordered the mother to
undergo treatment, which was to be reviewed at a later point; there was a clear
warning however that a failure to change her approach to the issue of sexual
abuse could threaten the mother’s long term care of the child.56
CSA is difficult to prove, even when it has occurred. When there has not
been any abuse, then it will be all but impossible for a parent to lead sufficient
evidence to establish the allegation. Such cases may involve a genuine, but
mistakenly held belief of abuse, or a deliberately false allegation.57 What is
clear is that where CSA is unsupported by any credible evidence, and the
parent making the allegation is implacable in their opposition to contact with
the other parent, then the court may very well reverse care with the possibility
of limited contact with the parent making the allegation.
As has been argued elsewhere,58 and as is further supported by the cases
cited in the next section of this article, there is therefore little to support the
claim that CSA is ‘easy to allege but difficult to disprove’ in family court.59
52 [2012] FamCAFC 25; BC201250073 at [25].
53 Langmeil v Grange (No 4) [2011] FamCA 605; BC201150441; Fielding and Mason [2011]
FMCAfam 1137; BC201110900; Jets v Maker (No 2) [2011] FMCAfam 1473;
BC201110770; Biggins v Brown [2011] FamCA 1027; BC201150783; Houston v Houston
[2011] FamCAFC 178; BC201150540; Smeeden v Wulandri [2011] FamCA 619;
BC201150538; Tripp v Tripp [2011] FamCA 598; BC201150529.
54 [2012] FamCAFC 13; BC201250039.
55 [2013] FamCA 75; BC2013501262.
56 Ibid, at [88].
57 For an example where the court was satisfied an allegation was deliberately false, see
Newberry v Newberry (No 2) [2013] FamCA 462; BC201350257. Of course, it is technically
possible that in some of these cases there was in fact CSA.
58 L Young, ‘Child sexual abuse allegations in the Family Court of Western Australia: An Old
Light on an old problem’ (1998) 3 Sister in Law 98.
59 This is a phrase no longer allowed in rape trials, but which still surfaces from time to time
in family law cases involving CSA; indeed note the High Court’s statement to this effect in
242 (2014) 28 Australian Journal of Family Law
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Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a lawyer advising a parent to persist with CSA
allegations for which there was little supporting evidence; at the very least
they would have to warn of the significant risk such a position entailed.60 As
shown below, judicial officers are acutely aware of the possibility of, and
dangers arising from, false allegations.61 Again, in terms of application of the
unacceptable risk test to CSA allegations, these cases do not provide
significant difficulty for judicial officers.62
Inconclusive evidence of sexual abuse of the child
On some occasions, the court will find itself confronted with evidence which
it considers is inconclusive either as to the fact of abuse or as to the
perpetrator. This is precisely how M v M presented and so was the context in
which this test was developed; but is the outcome of this now rather old
decision indicative of judicial decision-making generally today, particularly in
light of the pro-shared parenting reforms of 199663 and 2006?64
Even before those reforms, there were judicial decisions (perhaps the best
known, and most critiqued,65 is Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof))66
indicating the balance had already tipped in favour of preserving contact.
Carson, in the research for her unpublished PhD thesis, concluded that a
consideration of a sample of pre-2006 cases involving CSA allegations
showed a focus on establishing the truth or otherwise of the allegation and
conceiving the primary potential harm to children being the potential loss of
parental contact, rather than abuse.67
The degree of evidence required to prove past abuse is high and the cases
indicate that even where the child has made disclosures (and note that children
M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; 82 ALR 577; [1988] HCA 68; BC8802632 at p 77. See its recent
use in Kerrison v Kerrison [2013] FamCA 31 at [50] citing M v M; see also Fulton & Packer
[2013] FamCA 555 at [15] and Simpson & Hahn [2014] FamCA 674; BC201451436 at [64].
60 In Stevens & Stevens [2014] FamCA 192; BC201451230 at [26]–[27] it is recounted that the
mother said she changed her position as to the orders she sought, on legal advice to the effect
that the evidence would not support a finding leading to supervised contact. It is difficult to
imagine the mother was not equally warned of the dangers of a ‘hardline’ position, and not
seeming to accept the possibility of unsupervised contact.
61 There is no doubt the court is on the ‘qui vive’ for false allegations and routinely relies on
prior judicial statements emphasising the risks of false positives. See, eg, Mother and Father
(2006) 36 Fam LR 519; [2006] FCWA 89 at [12]–[15]. In this case, Thackray CJ relied on
an amicus brief prepared for a US case which presented evidence relevant to the reliability
of children’s evidence in particular where poor interviewing techniques were adopted.
62 That is not to say that other difficulties may not arise. For example, if a parent fabricated an
allegation, and drew the child into the fabrication, the child may be unwilling to see the
accused parent. If this has persisted for some time then the case may become extremely
difficult. But this is not because of the sexual abuse allegation per se. This is no different to
the situation that presented, for example, in the sad saga of Peter v Elspeth [2009] FamCA
551; BC200950342. There may be a variety of situations which lead to a child being
estranged from a parent; even where the truth as to the ‘blame’ for that estrangement is clear,
the difficulty arises because of the child’s unwillingness to have contact with the parent: see,
eg, Barzetti & Barzetti [2014] FamCA 233.
63 Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth).
64 Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth).
65 Fogarty, above n 9, at 251; Chisholm, above n 13.
66 Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof) (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; (2004) FLC 93-192; [2004]
FamCA 768.
67 Carson, above n 26, at 162–4.
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rarely give direct evidence in Australian family courts)68 some corroborative
evidence will usually also be required before any finding of abuse is made.69
The Full Court in Nikolakis quoted Carmody J in Murphy & Murphy70 saying:
without the alleged victims giving direct evidence, the forensic investigation of the
sexual abuse issue may well be inadequate, and the evidence insufficiently exact,
definite or precise enough to meet the requisite standard. Without any independent
source of substantiation or corroborative confirmation of the alleged abuse,
secondary evidence of untested disclosures of alleged child victims, will rarely
satisfy the court on the balance of probabilities of anything . . .71
In Nikolakis, the Full Court said the trial judge had been mindful of cases
which cautioned first instance judges against falling back on a finding of
unacceptable risk where they had insufficient evidence of abuse but were left
with an ‘uncomfortable or uneasy feeling’.72
In Hemiro and Sinla,73 Brown J listed a common set of factors which
contribute to the inability to find abuse established including: inconsistent
statements made by the child with regards to the abuse,74 inconclusive medical
examinations,75 perceived contaminated interviewing,76 perceived maternal
preoccupation with the potential for sexual abuse,77 an absence of any, or any
sustained, sexual themes in the child’s play, a child’s lack of fear of their
father78 and any perceived pressure on a child to make disclosures, by the
mother or any other person.79 As many of these factors might be present in a
case where there was sexual abuse, these ‘factors’ highlight the cautious
approach that is taken to assessing allegations of CSA.
While it is possible (though difficult) to locate cases where a finding of
unacceptable risk has resulted on the basis of uncorroborated disclosures by a
child and resulted in limited contact,80 there are, conversely, many such cases
68 See M Fernando, ‘What do Australian family law judges think about meeting with children’
(2012) 26 AJFL 51; M Fernando, ‘Conversations between judges and children: An argument
in favour of judicial conferences in contested children’s matters’ (2009) 23 AJFL 48;
E Ryrstedt, L Young and A Nicholson, ‘The Voice of the Child in Swedish Law’ (2012) 3
FLP 29.
69 A case that highlights this is Hasset v Weader [2011] FamCA 319; BC201150897, where
very clear disclosures by a young child, repeated with consistency, in circumstances where
the mother was found not have coached the child (indeed she was uncertain herself) were
insufficient to result in a finding of abuse.
70 [2007] FamCA 795; BC200750675. Carmody J provides a very detailed, and interesting,
discussion of the unacceptable risk test in CSA cases.
71 [2010] FamCAFC 52; BC201050147 at [89] (emphasis added).
72 Ibid, at [84].
73 [2009] FamCA 181 at [355].
74 See, eg, Carbine & Jetton [2013] FamCA 310; BC201350375 and Gahen & Gahen [2013]
FamCA 730.
75 See, eg, S & S [2001] FMCAfam 185.
76 See, eg, Richards v Brown [2011] FamCA 662; BC201150813.
77 See, eg, Steel & Galloway [2012] FamCAFC 25; BC201250073.
78 Note earlier in the decision it was accepted by experts that abusers and victims could present
with a positive relationship: at [296].
79 See, eg, Stamos v Mariakis [2008] FamCA 727; BC200850568.
80 See, eg, S & S [2001] FMCAfam 185. Here contact was limited to four times a year because
the evidence satisfied the Federal Magistrate that the child had in fact made the disclosures
and this was having very significant adverse effects on the mother.
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where the finding is that there is no unacceptable risk of abuse.81 The shared
parenting reforms of 2006 increased the emphasis on maintaining child-parent
relationships; those amendments have been criticised for shifting the balance
too far in favour of shared care in cases where violence is concerned. Thus,
one might well predict that cases heard post-2006 may not reflect the outcome
in M v M, but rather tend to favour preserving contact, in line with the thinking
in Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof).
In Knibbs v Knibbs,82 the two children, a male aged 11 (N) and a female
aged 6 (S), both made several disclosures to several persons regarding the
father. The disclosures made to the mother by S included disclosures where
she described her father touching her inappropriately at a swimming pool.
Disclosures were also made by N to his mother where he described in detail
being touched inappropriately by the father on a number of occasions while
spending overnight time with him. These were repeated to an interviewing
police officer. S then made further statements which were indicative of abuse
by the father.
Despite detailed disclosures, the trial judge did not make any positive
findings of abuse. This was partly because he believed the children had been
influenced by their mother as a result of her questioning them in regard to the
incidents. He also found that the father seemed genuinely shocked when faced
with the allegations of abuse and overall the father impressed him as a frank
and candid witness.83 Despite the various disclosures made by the children,
the trial judge held the father to be a man ‘incapable of sexually abusing’ his
children,84 and found there was no unacceptable risk if the children were to
spend unsupervised time with him. Cases such as these indicate that, despite
the outcome in M v M, a mere ‘lingering doubt’ or vague suspicion of sexual
abuse is unlikely, without more, to be sufficient to result in suspended contact
with a parent (though it might be said that the evidence amounted to more in
this case). Further, even if there is found to be a risk of sexual abuse of a child,
a decision-maker may well conclude that by putting in place protective
measures, the risk is rendered acceptable.85
81 See, eg, Young and Young [2010] FMCAfam 931; BC201010339; Knibbs v Knibbs [2010]
FamCA 446; BC201050512; Hemmingway v Holmes [2012] FamCA 17; BC201250022;
Hemiro v Sinla [2009] FamCA 181; Lavery v Lavery [2012] FamCA 126; BC201250174.
82 [2010] FamCA 446; BC201050512.
83 It is difficult to understand how much weight can be placed on a parent’s denial in such
cases. Innocent parents will deny abuse; but so will perpetrators. If detecting the truth of the
matter was possible simply from viewing the demeanour of the alleged abuser in a witness
stand then these (and indeed criminal) cases would not be so difficult. While uncommon,
note the recognition of this by Carmody J in Murphy & Murphy [2007] FamCA 795;
BC200750675 at [157].
84 [2010] FamCA 446; BC201050512 at [76]. It is difficult to understand how the judge felt
qualified to draw such a conclusion.
85 See, eg, W v W (Abuse allegations: unacceptable risk) (2005) 34 Fam LR 129; (2005) FLC
93-235; [2005] FamCA 892 and Murphy & Murphy [2007] FamCA 795; BC200750675
(note the first mentioned case was decided before the shared parenting reforms of 2006 and
resulted in supervised contact). In Murphy supervised contact was really just a precursor to
reintroducing unsupervised contact. See also Young and Young [2010] FMCAfam 931;
BC201010339 where contact was to be ‘monitored’ by family members, and certain
restrictions imposed, as a result of graphic disclosures by the children. This case is
interesting as the (then) Federal Magistrate at [142] seems to limit himself to the proposals
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Moreover, it is quite possible in this category of case for there to be an order
that the child spend substantial and significant time with the father against
whom the allegation has been made.86 Care is unlikely to be reversed, as there
is at least sufficient evidence to render the mother’s concerns ‘reasonable’. For
this reason, in this difficult category of case, it may be strategically important
for mothers to ‘let go’ of their fears, notwithstanding the evidence presented,
or the danger of a reversal of care may materialise. Once a finding of no
unacceptable risk is made, then contact is very likely to be ordered, and the
parent bringing forward the allegation will be compelled to facilitate contact.
That is, a parent may be expected to approach their parenting in a way we
would not tolerate for intact families; if abuse is not proved they may be
expected to behave as if it did not happen, regardless of the evidence
presented.
The unacceptable risk test is not challenged by the cases in the first three
categories set out above; one would not need to be so careful in choosing the
parameters of the test if confronted only with the relatively ‘easy’ cases. It is
precisely because of concerns about ‘getting it wrong’ in the last category that
a case such as M v M reached the High Court. As we can see from the above,
there is every chance that if abuse is not proved (and abuse is rarely proved),
there will be a finding of no unacceptable risk, and (if the mother can manage
it) the ultimate outcome may be some degree of shared parenting; if the
mother cannot acquiesce convincingly, a reversal of care is possible.
Moreover, as discussed below, judicial officers are acutely aware of the
potential for false allegations and regularly refer to the serious dangers
associated with curtailing contact with a parent.87
It might be argued that the picture presented above is inaccurate, as
outcomes in final decisions may be misleading due to the impact of interim
orders suspending contact.88 There is an absence of data in this regard,89
however, case law does not suggest that interim orders invariably suspend
contact where CSA allegations emerge.90 Farina v Farina91 involved an
put by the parents in relation to the protection of the child, notwithstanding the emphatic
statements by superior courts (see Hayne J in U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238; 191 ALR 289;
[2002] HCA 36; BC200205110 and Sampson v Hartnett (No 10) (2007) 215 FLR 155; 38
Fam LR 315; [2007] FamCA 1365; BC200750077) to the effect that the court is not limited
by the parties’ proposals and must rather seek the arrangement that best promotes the child’s
welfare.
86 See, eg, Hemmingway v Holmes [2012] FamCA 17; BC201250022; Hemiro v Sinla [2009]
FamCA 181; Lavery v Lavery [2012] FamCA 126; BC201250174.
87 See, eg, Brewster FM’s detailed consideration of the impact of curtailing contact in S & S
[2001] FMCAfam 185 at [97]–[102].
88 We note the comments in this regard in Fryer, above n 33, where it is suggested that contact
is routinely suspended at an interim stage after an allegation is made and that there can be
lengthy periods of no contact as matters proceed toward trial. However, it is difficult to
assess this claim as Fryer provides no supporting evidence for this claim.
89 One of the authors sought to test this quite some years ago with research in the Family Court
of Western Australia however the ethics committee of that court refused access to court
records on the basis of the ‘sensitive’ nature of these cases.
90 See, eg, the following cases where it appears contact was ordered (or agreed) pending trial:
Harry & Harry [2007] FMCAfam 616; BC200712031; Maxwell & Cross [2014] FamCA
170; BC201451217; Tyler & Sullivan [2014] FamCA 178; BC201451092; Pollock &
Breen-Pollock [2014] FamCA 171; BC201451218; Hoffman & Barone [2014] FamCA 52;
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interim decision where the evidence was such that the judicial officer found
there was a possibility of abuse by the father (in light of disclosures and
sexualised behaviour), but refused to suspend contact pending a further report,
opting instead for supervised contact. In quoting the Full Court in Re W (Sex
Abuse: Standard of Proof),92 this judicial officer evidenced the very high
priority placed on guarding against the consequences of a false positive at this
stage:
A false negative finding accompanied by appropriate safeguards as to the future
relationship between parent and child, such as adequate supervision to guard against
possible abuse, may be far less disastrous for the child than an erroneous positive
finding that leads to a cessation of the parent-child relationship. The court needs to
remain conscious of this imperfection at all times . . .93
Critique of the ‘unacceptable risk’ test
In M v M, the High Court noted that previous attempts to ‘define with greater
precision the magnitude of the risk which will justify a court in denying a
parent access to a child’ had ‘resulted in a variety of formulations . . .’ and that
‘[t]his imposing array indicates that the courts are striving for a greater degree
of definition than the subject is capable of yielding’.94 And yet it selected one
of those formulations, with little discussion as to the reason for its choice.95 M
v M is just 27 paragraphs long. It very firmly sets the task of considering CSA
allegations within the broader context of the application of the best interests
principle, though the High Court did not give detailed consideration to
precisely what that involves. However, it highlighted the fundamentally
different nature of this process from that of most civil trials, which very often
focus on liability for past actions, and thus whether or not those actions can
be proved:
After all, in deciding what is in the best interests of a child, the Family Court is
frequently called upon to assess and evaluate the likelihood or possibility of events
or occurrences which, if they come about, will have a detrimental impact on the
child’s welfare.96
But herein lies the conundrum. The test was developed because of the
category of ‘hard’ cases — and yet that is precisely where its weakness is
BC201451136; Gabel & Meltzer [2014] FCCA 604; BC201403680; Langmeil & Grange
(No 4) [2011] FamCA 605; BC201150441; Tranmere & Clever [2014] FCCA 1827; Ruth
(aka Hutton ) and Hutton (2011) 45 Fam LR 399; [2011] FamCAFC 99; BC201150259;
Simen & Simen (No 2) [2014] FamCA 7; BC20145126052; Hibberd & Banner [2014]
FamCA 320; BC201451397; Simpson & Hahn [2014] FamCA 674; BC201451436;
Tranmere & Cleaver [2014] FCCA 1827; Helbig & Rowe [2014] FamCAFC 179;
BC201451445. See also Enmore & Smoothe [2014] FamCAFC 131 where there was no
supervision arrangement pending trial. In Howard & Lipschitz [2014] FamCA 272 it was
noted at [5] that at an interim stage care was reversed in favour of the father.
91 [2012] FMCAfam 666; BC201205587.
92 (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; (2004) FLC 93-192; [2004] FamCA 768 at [19].
93 Ibid, at [8], quoting Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof) (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; (2004)
FLC 93-192; [2004] FamCA 768 at [19], referring to WK v SR (1997) 22 Fam LR 592;
(1997) FLC 92-787 at [18]–[19].
94 (1988) 166 CLR 69; 82 ALR 577; [1988] HCA 68; BC8802632 at [25].
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid, at [24] (emphasis added).
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revealed. The test rests on an assessment of the probability of future abuse;97
when usually the only fact that could provide the basis for assessing the risk
of future abuse is the fact of past abuse, the determination of that fact
inevitably becomes the central — and potentially determinative — issue. As
Parkinson has noted in this context:
There is no such thing in law as an unestablished fact, for if it is unestablished, then
in law it does not represent a fact at all. All findings of fact are binary in nature.
Either a fact is proven or it is not. An event occurred, or it did not. The abuse
happened, or it did not.98
Assessing risk rests on a calculation of the probability of future events
happening.99 However, the probability of an event cannot be determined if
certain key facts are not known — if one does not know how many red and
yellow balls there are in a container, then one simply cannot assess the
probability of selecting either a red or yellow ball. There may be no yellow
balls (ie, no abuse) or all yellow balls (ongoing abuse). Without ‘knowing’ that
piece of the puzzle the court is simply unable to predict risk, other than on
general factors that might predict the likelihood of anyone sexually abusing a
child. The factors that go to proving whether or not abuse occurred in the past
cannot assist in determining whether future abuse is likely, if no conclusion
was able to be drawn about the happening of the past abuse; this is a
fundamental problem with most of the factors outlined in N and s and
Separate Representative, which are so routinely relied upon by the Family
Court as relevant questions in deciding whether there is an unacceptable risk
of future abuse. That list conflates the two processes of determining past abuse
and assessing future risk.100 For example, the level of detail of a disclosure by
a child will be relevant to whether a finding of abuse can be made; however
without knowing if the abuse occurred, that factor cannot help predict the
future risk of abuse. If both proving the abuse and determining if there is an
unacceptable risk of abuse depend on the same process of assessing the
strength of the evidence of abuse, this will naturally lead to a conflation of
those issues and increase the likelihood that a finding of no abuse will lead
inexorably to a finding of no unacceptable risk. This creates something of a
cliff effect, so that a finding of no abuse has the potential to shift the focus
immediately to the question of how to promote contact.
But the High Court exhorts judges both to assess risk and to avoid making
findings on the one matter that is crucial to the assessment of that risk (on the
basis of unexplained ‘family’ considerations). It is little wonder the Full Court
97 This was emphasised by Murphy J in Harridge & Harridge [2010] FamCA 445;
BC201050510 at [73]ff.
98 P Parkinson, ‘Family Law and Parent-Child Contact: Assessing the Risk of Sexual Abuse’
(1999) 23 MULR 345 at 353. See also Justice Carmody, ‘Removing Obstacles to Justice in
Family Court Sex Abuse Cases’, March 2005, 4th World Congress on Family & Child
Rights cited in Fogarty, above n 9.
99 We accept this is a very narrow explanation of the concept of probabilities, however, a more
nuanced mathematically accurate analysis would only sharpen our point.
100 Murphy J in Harridge v Harridge [2010] FamCA 445; BC201050510 recast these questions
somewhat, and this has been referred to in other decisions (eg, Kirby v Holmes [2013]
FamCA 75; BC2013501262) however again this formulation rests on an assumption that the
probability of risk can in fact be assessed.
248 (2014) 28 Australian Journal of Family Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 21 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Mon Dec 8 13:18:43 2014
/journals/journal/ajfl/vol28pt3/part_3
has said that, despite there being no requirement to prove abuse and authority
to support caution in doing so, invariably an investigation into the happening
of that event will occur.101
In many cases it will not be possible to make a finding as to whether the
abuse occurred, and so this crucial piece in the puzzle for assessing risk
remains unavailable to the decision-maker. Of course, a finding that abuse is
not proved is not a finding that abuse did not happen. As Faulks J noted in
Kings and Murray,102 this leaves the judge in a bind when trying to apply the
unacceptable risk test:
. . . I do not derive any significant assistance from the concept of unacceptable risk.
If, as I have suggested, I am unable conclusively to determine on the basis of the
evidence before me whether something has happened or not, in my opinion, it seems
to me that it is almost impossible for me then to say that there still might be a risk
that it something [sic] may have happened and that therefore the child should spend
no time with her father . . . Nor could I alternatively conclude that there is no risk,
because I have not been able to find it and that therefore there should be unqualified
time spent between the father and the child.103
This underlying flaw in the test is the genesis of the two different strands of
critique that have evolved. One long standing and persistent strand rests on the
fear that, where there is suspicion but no proof, judges will use the test to
justify curtailing contact ‘just to be safe’.104 This fear is well evidenced in a
recent paper by Fryer105 which recites the issue as seen by critics:
The knowingly false allegation is especially contemptuous. No allegation is easier
to make or more difficult to refute. It reverses the presumption of innocence and
places an almost impossible burden on an accused parent to disprove a non-event.
The nature of the false allegation . . . is seen by the accusing parent as a tool,
regarded as de rigeur, and alleged without any regard for the devastating
consequences. The brutal reality for an accused parent is the cessation of any
meaningful relationship between the child and themselves for the duration of any
proceedings and, most likely, beyond. The malicious word of a former partner, or a
coached word of an innocent child, is quite simply all that is needed to ruin lives . . .
Because the court is only required to decide on the balance of probabilities, a cloud
of doubt will forever linger over the accused and the court will invariably maintain
a cautious approach when making a final order, due largely to the inconclusiveness
of its own findings.106
This has a well-worn ring to it; that ‘the problem’ in sexual abuse cases is
rampant false claims by malicious mothers. To support the claim that false
allegations are ‘rife’ in Australian family courts, Fryer provides some
statistics, however, there is no consideration of what that data says about the
likelihood of actual abuse being detected by the court, nor of the statistics on
prevalence rates of child sexual abuse.107 The focus on mothers as the
101 W and W (Abuse allegations: unacceptable risk) [2005] Fam CA 892; (2005) FLC 93-235
at [111].
102 [2009] FamCA 565; BC200950461.
103 Ibid, at [43].
104 Young, above n 58.
105 Fryer, above n 33.
106 Ibid, at 141 and 152.
107 For a summary of the data that suggests high rates of child sexual abuse in the general
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predominant claimants gives no consideration to the data on who primarily
sexually abuses children108 nor does it consider to whom children might be
most likely to disclose. No consideration is given to false denials as a problem.
Most notably, however, the statements in the above extract about what courts
do (that is, how the unacceptable risk test operates), are not supported by
reference to any actual case outcomes. Fryer’s approach to this topic is
heralded by his opening the paper with the surprising statement that the family
court is well placed to, and deals well with, violence issues109 — a claim in
stark contrast to research findings which resulted in recent amendments to
Pt VII.110
This preoccupation with false positives and false allegations is not a new
phenomenon.111 Others have complained in this vein that, based on M v M,
‘[u]ltimately, it may be a matter of a “gut feeling”: “even intuition and
guesswork”’.112 But case law does not bear this out, and commentators and the
judiciary have highlighted the countervailing strand of critique of this test,113
namely, that it has resulted in an inappropriate judicial over-concern about
‘false positives’, with some disturbing judicial comments reflecting this,114 in
particular a suggestion that false positives are more concerning than false
negatives. As Fogarty J notes:
It is a mistake for the Full Court to state the problem in a way that suggests that the
adverse consequences of one wrong conclusion — a false finding that there has been
sexual abuse (when the child has actually not been abused) — are necessarily more
damaging than those of the other wrong conclusion — a finding that there has not
been sexual abuse (when in fact the child was abused) . . . The gravity of such
consequences has always been acknowledged. But to start with an entrenched view
that the consequences ‘cannot be overstated’ or are ‘too horrible to contemplate’
warps the process explained by the High Court.115
The fear of the impact of ‘lingering doubts’ on decision-making has led
some commentators to suggest a different approach should be adopted.
Roebuck has argued that:
population, see K Richards, ‘Misconceptions about child sex offenders’, Australian Institute
of Criminology, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No 429, September 2011.
108 For a discussion of the statistics on who commits child sexual abuse, see ibid. Notably, ABS
statistics based on self-reports identified men as the predominant abusers, with 13.5% being
fathers or step-fathers (rising to 16.5% where the victim was female) with only 0.8% being
abused by mothers: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2005, Personal Safety Survey Australia,
ABS, Canberra.
109 Fryer, above n 33, at 137.
110 Family Law Legislation Amendments (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011
(Cth). This is discussed further later in the article.
111 Young, above n 58.
112 Fogarty, above n 9, citing a phrase from CJD v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172; 159 ALR 138.
113 Young, above n 58; Fogarty, above n 9; Chisholm, above n 13.
114 K v B (1994) 17 Fam LR 722; (1994) FLC 92-478; Re W (Sex Abuse; Standard of Proof)
(2004) 32 Fam LR 249; FLC 93-192; WK v SR (1997) 22 Fam LR 592; [1997] FLC 92-787.
For a review of the research on the impact of sexual abuse on children, see J Cashmore and
R Shackel, The long term effects of child sexual abuse, CFCA Paper No 11, 2013, at
<http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/pubslatest.php> accessed (4 December 2014).
115 Fogarty, above n 9, at 280 and 283.
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In cases where allegations have been made and some evidence exists as to past
sexual abuse, the court should make a decision based on the relevant facts as proved,
on the balance of probabilities, as to whether abuse has taken place. In these cases
the court should effectively ‘level the playing field’ in order to see clearly and
objectively, without the influence of ‘lingering doubts’ or mere suspicion.116
Similarly, in Bates’ view:
it may be all too easy to ignore traditional and appropriate legal safeguards in order
to punish an alleged perpetrator, a course of action which can be justified or
rationalised by the stated goal of the protection of the child’s welfare or best
interests. One, it is suggested, must be immediately disturbed by an articulated view
that findings of fact are not central to any adjudication relating to serious allegations
in family law proceedings.117
The advantage of the approach of Roebuck is that it does away with the
fiction that the court can accurately assess the risk of future abuse in the
absence of definite knowledge as to whether past abuse occurred.118 However
intuitively attractive, we would suggest there are potential dangers with this
approach. The only impact such a change could have would be to weaken the
protection of children. As it presently stands in terms of cases that are decided
by the court, a likely outcome is that where there has not been abuse, children
are still seeing their fathers, notwithstanding the allegation of abuse. We are
not aware of any evidence that establishes otherwise and case reports (as
discussed above) suggest this. Conversely, there must be a high likelihood that
some abused children are falling through the gaps due to the difficulty of
establishing abuse.119 At least with the present test, there is the possibility that,
due to uncertainty as to the existence of past abuse, measures will be put in
place by the court to provide some protection for those cases where abuse has
occurred but cannot be proved (supervision for example). Moreover, true
allegations are more likely to be brought forward in this environment. Just as
with family violence more generally, the spectre of some false allegations
(which is a feature of all litigation) should not weaken the protection given to
actual victims of violence. If the suggested alternative approach were adopted,
it is possible the court would consider protective measures were not required
as no abuse had been proved and no order should be made based on an
unproved allegation. Thus, either outcomes would be the same, or they would
be less protective. There is no possibility of such an approach providing
greater protection for abused children.
At one level, this all makes a strong argument for retaining the unacceptable
risk test in its present form; while it may not protect all children from real
abuse, it has a greater chance of protecting some of them, even when abuse
cannot be definitively proved, than an approach such as Roebuck suggests.
116 J Roebuck, ‘Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse: Should “Unacceptable Risk” be the Only
Criterion for Refusal of Contact? An evaluation of Re H & Ors (Minors) (Sexual Abuse:
Standard of Proof [1996] 1 All ER 1’ (1996) 3 JCULR 116 at 128.
117 F Bates, ‘New Developments in Child Sexual Abuse and the Fact-Finding Process’ (1998)
5 (1&2) Canberra Law Review 111 at 112.
118 On the artificiality of a process that purports to assess risk on the basis of unproved facts, see
also P Parkinson, ‘Child Sexual Abuse Allegations in the Family Court’ (1990) 4 AJFL 60
at 79.
119 Young, above n 58.
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Reflecting this more protective approach, Chisholm considers the test, used in
the context of the best interests principle, is sufficiently clear, and necessarily
flexible.120 Thus, the reason some continue to support the unacceptable risk
test (and the reason for rejecting the suggested alternative approach) is that it
is in keeping with the core function of the court. As its supporters rightly
assert, the test must be looked at in the context of the general application of
the best interests principle; it can hardly be in a child’s best interests for a
parenting order to expose them to an ‘unacceptable’ risk of abuse. The court
is exercising a discretion based on the information it has before it; there is no
‘right’ answer even if a past fact is conclusively proved (and many are not)
because ultimately the future is being predicted. The routine business of the
court is to put weight on the evidence before it, and come up with the solution
that it believes best promotes the future interests of the child in light of that
evidence (and that will include trying not to make orders that expose children
to unacceptable levels of risk). The court is very often in the position of trying
to predict outcomes for children against a backdrop of evidence that points to
conflicting outcomes. If there is evidence of sexualised behaviour by a child,
the court must consider that evidence; it cannot be discounted as irrelevant
because it does not conclusively prove CSA (which may happen to be the
reason why that particular evidence is led). To do otherwise is to turn the case
into a civil trial on the matter of CSA. While the unacceptable risk test may
itself rely on a fiction, it makes some sense in light of the overall nature of the
power being exercised.
There has been decision-making which reflects this approach. Indeed, in In
the Marriage of N and S, and before setting out his list of questions and
reverting to the unacceptable risk phraseology, Fogarty J said:
The High Court’s decision must be read as taking a cautious approach to the issue,
in light of the paramountcy of the welfare of the child, and the gravity of the possible
effects of sexual abuse. Largely it means that if there is an ascertainable risk of harm
the court must so mould its orders as to avoid exposure of the child to that harm.121
The test might be seen, therefore, as judicial shorthand for what the family
court does all the time — look at the evidence as to what has happened in the
past and try and predict what will be the best parenting option for the child in
the future. The predictive nature of the exercise is the same whether CSA
allegations are involved or not. The court has no doubt striven to formulate,
and give content to, a test in this regard because of the perceived seriousness
of CSA, both in terms of its potential effects on a child, and what it says about
an abuser as a potential parent, and the consequences that flow therefrom.
However, it is difficult to articulate a logical rationale for developing a ‘test’
for what is simply one example of the application of the best interests
principle.122 Further, the current formulation is problematic. First, it leads to
120 Chisholm, above n 13, at 23.
121 (1995) 19 Fam LR 837 at 859; 129 FLR 243; (1996) FLC 92-655.
122 Much the same could be said about relocation cases. They are very difficult parenting
decisions with potentially severe consequences for family members, however, no test has
been developed as such, simply the identification of facets of a case that may be particularly
relevant where relocation is sought. If there is any doubt that judicial officers treat the
‘unacceptable risk’ formulation as a kind of legal test, see, eg, Welchman Rubie & Zawada
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an (inevitably futile) attempt to describe whether a particular risk is acceptable
or unacceptable, when in fact in (at least) the difficult cases the actual risk
cannot be assessed. Second, it encourages outcomes that are all but
predetermined depending on whether the abuse is proved or not due to the
very high standard of proof in relation to a finding of abuse; that is, it is
extremely difficult to secure a finding of an unacceptable risk of abuse in the
absence of a finding of abuse and this leads to conflation of the issues.123
Third, as Faulks J indicated, the sheer illogicality of the test in these hard cases
creates obstacles, not assistance, to decision-making and has resulted in some
judges adopting a stance which prioritises parent-child contact over the
protection of children.
As the Full Court recently emphasised in Simmons & Kingley,124 the
legislation provides a pathway for resolving parenting disputes and this does
not include any reference to ‘unacceptable risk’.125 In the context of a different
type of risk of harm to the child,126 their Honours pointed to the words of
s 60CC(2)(b) — which refers to the ‘need to protect’ the child from harm —
as requiring only that ‘any relevant risk . . . be identified and assessed’.127 In
this case, the trial judge had on a few occasions used the expression
‘unacceptable risk’, however, on appeal it was argued she should have referred
to ‘unacceptable risk authorities’, which she had not done; the appeal failed.
In addition, further thought needs to be given to the application of the
Briginshaw128 test in this context. This test was formulated in a divorce case,
where proof of allegations of adultery was essential to the grant of the divorce.
Dixon J famously said:
when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual
persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found
as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any
belief in its reality. No doubt an opinion that a state of acts exists may be held
according to indefinite gradations of certainty . . . [At common law ] . . . it is enough
that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the
tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or
established independently of the nature and consequences of the fact or facts to be
proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an
occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from
a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer . . .129
This statement is accepted as forming the basis of s 140 of the Evidence Act
1995 (Cth), which relevantly says the following as to how a civil court is to
[2013] FamCA 862 at [135]; Matthews & Bender (No 2) [2013] FamCA 74 at [19]–[21];
Carbirne & Jetton [2013] FamCA 310; BC201350375 at [26]; Gilmore & Ray [2013]
FamCA 153 at [29]; Farina & Farina [2012] FMCAfam 666; BC201205587 at [93]ff.
123 See, eg, Baldwin & Baldwin [2014] FamCA 43; BC201451313. Having decided the
evidence did not establish sexual abuse of the child (note this was not a case where the court
found there was no abuse), the judge moved without further discussion to the conclusion that
there was no unacceptable risk of abuse: at [109].
124 [2014] FamCAFC 47; BC201451112 at [20].
125 We leave aside for the moment the relevance of s 60CG.
126 The father had a history of alcohol abuse and associated driving offences.
127 [2014] FamCAFC 47; BC201451112 at [20].
128 (1938) 60 CLR 336.
129 Ibid, at 361–2 (emphasis added).
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be satisfied on a balance of probabilities:
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding
whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
(a) The nature of the cause of action or defence;, and
(b) The nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and
(c) The gravity of the matters alleged.
A number of issues arise in relation to the application of this section in CSA
cases in family court. First, when does this higher civil standard apply?
Certainly it applies to a finding of sexual abuse by a parent. Some judges have
also suggested that it may apply to a finding that a parent is making tactical
false allegations of sexual abuse, as such a finding could result in limited or
no contact with that parent.130 If no finding of sexual abuse is made, the law
requires the decision-maker to determine if there is an unacceptable risk of
abuse. Does s 140 apply to this determination, so as to elevate the evidence
required to meet the standard of proof? In Johnson v Page,131 it was argued
on appeal that the trial Judge had wrongly adopted such an approach. The Full
Court, relying heavily on the analysis of Fogarty J,132 concluded the ordinary
civil standard of proof applies at this stage.133 However, Fogarty J also made
the following comment in N v S:
The notion of ‘unacceptable risk’ must be assessed in light of the grave
consequences of sexual abuse to a child’s development, as well as the effects of
future contact with the party.134
Unfortunately, the Full Court did not consider what this statement might
mean, in terms of the application of s 140.
Section 140(2) has three subsections, all of which must be considered. The
High Court in M v M considered the ‘nature of the proceedings’ when setting
this test (before s 140 was enacted) by discussing the nature of the discretion
in parenting decisions; however, only s 140(2)(c) (the gravity of the matters
alleged) is referred to by the Full Court in Johnson v Page.135 Little attention
is now paid to the rest of s 140 in family court cases involving CSA
allegations. Is it not arguable (and perhaps even more so since the introduction
of s 60CC(2A)) that the nature of a parenting dispute under Pt VII and the
subject matter of the proceedings are such that s 140 does apply to elevate the
standard of proof required when making a finding of no unacceptable risk? In
other words, shouldn’t the court have to be satisfied by very compelling
evidence that a child will not be exposed to abuse?
It would be useful for the Full Court to consider in more detail how the
burden of proof operates in these cases in light of the totality of s 140. It
certainly seems there is some confusion on the issue of the standard of proof
in these cases. In Gahen & Gahen,136 the Full Court took no issue with the
130 See, eg, Lett & Lett [2014] FamCA 52; BC201451489 at [52]–[53].
131 (2007) FLC 93-344; [2007] FamCA 1235.
132 Fogarty, above n 9.
133 (2007) FLC 93-344; [2007] FamCA 1235 at [64]–[77] (emphasis added).
134 N and S and the Separate Representative (1996) FLC 92-655 at 82,174; (1995) 19 FamLR
837.
135 (2007) FLC 93-344; [2007] FamCA 1235 at [77].
136 [2014] FamCAFC 122; BC201451326.
254 (2014) 28 Australian Journal of Family Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 27 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Mon Dec 8 13:18:43 2014
/journals/journal/ajfl/vol28pt3/part_3
following statement of the trial Judge, who found both that the father had not
sexually abused the child in question and that there was no unacceptable risk
of abuse: ‘The facts in legal proceedings are binary. There’s a burden of proof,
or a standard of proof. If the standard of proof is not met, the reverse is the
probability’137 and ‘if . . . a factual issue in a case has to be decided one way
or another . . . if the burden is not met then the binary nature of the
proceedings means that the reverse is probably correct’.138 However, this
makes no sense, particularly if a higher civil standard of proof is being applied
to a finding — the failure to meet the standard of proof for a finding of sexual
abuse cannot mean it is probably correct to say that a child was not sexually
abused.
Finally, there is something disturbing about a test that is always phrased in
the negative (and very often a double negative — ‘no unacceptable risk’). The
power of language should not be overlooked. Although unconscious, what
comfort does a decision-maker derive by being able to cast an order as ‘not
giving rise to an unacceptable risk’ — rather than as an order that gives rise
to an acceptable risk of abuse (particularly where there is evidence consistent
with abuse)? At the very least, the potential for this formulation (which seems
to run counter to s 60CC(2A)) to unconsciously impact on how decisions are
made should be considered.
The impact of legislative amendments
Section 60CG
From the time of M v M to 1996 the unacceptable risk test was a common law
creature. Section 60CG was inserted into the FLA in 1996,139 and now comes
after the various considerations set out in s 60CC:
60CG Court to consider risk of family violence
(1) In considering what order to make, the court must, to the extent that it is
possible to do so consistently with the child’s best interests being the
paramount consideration, ensure that the order:
(a) (a) is consistent with any family violence order; and
(b) does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the court may include in the order any
safeguards that it considers necessary for the safety of those affected by the
order.
This section resulted from a recommendation of the Second Report of the
Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, which considered the
introduction of the 1996 reforms.140 The committee received a submission
from the Australian Law Reform Commission expressing concern about three
sections, including proposed s 68K (now s 60CG), to the effect they did not
take sufficient account of the fact that the safety of the resident parent could
137 Ibid, at [75].
138 Ibid, at [84].
139 By the Family Law Reform Act (Cth) 1995; it was originally s 68K.
140 Recommendation 4; see the Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Reform
Bill 1994, at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/flrb1994193/memo_4.pdf>
(accessed 2 June 2014).
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not be separated from the issue of the safety of the child.141 From the scant
discussion, it seems the purpose of the revised s 68K was to ensure third
parties (particularly the resident parent) were not exposed to an unacceptable
risk of family violence by the making of a contact order between the child and
the non-resident parent.142 This is reinforced by the terms of s 60CG(2), which
seems to be directed at those ‘affected’ by the order, as opposed to those the
object of the order. Further, other sections deal directly with how the court
takes account of violence in respect of the child the subject of proceedings;
s 60CG is effectively redundant so far as the child is concerned. There was no
recorded parliamentary discussion about the adoption of the terminology
‘unacceptable risk’, nor any apparent conscious legislative decision to give
statutory force to the test. However, it is very likely the drafter drew on M v
M in framing this section.
The Full Court has said nothing on the application or interpretation of this
section,143 however case law supports the conclusion it is predominantly being
used to consider the safety of those other than the children the subject of
proceedings.144 Conversely, in relation to the appropriate test to be applied in
CSA cases, and more generally in relation to violence, decision-makers still
refer routinely to M v M.145 While it seems s 60CG was not intended to act as
a broad statutory codification of the principle laid out in M v M, the words of
the section are quite clear. They apply to all persons (including the child) and
they apply to family violence, which includes sexual abuse of children. We
return to this section in our later discussion.
Section 60CC(2A)
Until 2006 the FLA included one list of mandatory considerations relevant to
the exercise of the best interests discretion; no legislative priority was
141 Second Report of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, at [1.30].
142 Note that Parkinson assumes this also: P Parkinson, ‘Violence, abuse and the limits of shared
parental responsibility’ (2013) Family Matters 7 at 14.
143 Austlii reveals no Full Court consideration of s 68K and only three cases referring to s 60CG
two of which do not in fact discuss the section: Sigley & Evor (2011) 44 Fam LR 439; [2011]
FamCAFC 22; BC201150053 and Kitsannis and Netopoulis [2010] FamCAFC 214;
BC201051078. First instance Family Court of Australia decisions reveal only one reference
to s 68K (Flanagan & Handcock (2001) 27 Fam LR 615; (2001) FLC 93-074; [2000]
FamCA 150) and that is a mere recitation of a whole string of sections. While many later
first instance decisions cite s 60CG we have not been able to find any discussion of its
interpretation.
144 Robertson & Sento [2009] FamCAFC 49; BC200950017 at [68]; Poblano & Millard [2007]
FamCA 242 at [94]; Addington & Koldsjor [2008] FamCA 143; BC200851083 at [121];
Sheldon & Weir (No 3) [2010] FamCA 1138; BC201051272 at [571]; Cleary & Cleary
[2013] FCCA 594; BC201310455 at [37]; Eyton and Eyton [2013] FamCA 657;
BC201350490 at [59] and [119]. Compare Eddy & Night [2007] FamCA 1171;
BC200750654 where this section seems to be cited in relation to the risk of violence vis a
vis the child: at [113]–[115].
145 See, eg, Richards v Brown [2011] FamCA 662; BC201150813 where s 60CG is recited at the
outset in laying out the relevant law but in the discussion of the CSA allegations it is the case
law and M v M that is relied upon. In Bosch & Rickard [2011] FMCAfam 726, Turner FM
was considering the dangers of the father’s alleged violent (non-sexual) behaviour and
applied the unacceptable risk test referring first, however, to s 60CG: at [62].
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accorded to any factor.146 This best interests checklist was amended in 2006147
so that the benefit to a child of a meaningful relationship with both parents,
and protection of children from abuse and neglect, became ‘primary’
considerations with all other matters being assigned to a class of ‘additional’
considerations.148 There was, however, nothing which explained how the two
primary considerations were to be weighed when in conflict with each other,
which they invariably will be where violence or abuse towards a child by a
parent is alleged.
At the time of the 2006 amendments concern was expressed in some
quarters that these provisions would weaken the protection of women and
children from violence; that is, the pro-shared parenting provisions in
combination with other new provisions would tend to outweigh protection
from violence in favour of parent-child contact.149 As the result of
considerable evaluation and research into the effects of the 2006
amendments,150 the legislature has accepted these concerns and amended the
FLA, effective 7 June 2012.151 A new section, s 60CC(2A), has been inserted
which says that, when applying the two primary considerations, the court is to
give greater weight to the primary consideration of the need to protect the
child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or
exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.152 There is no discussion in
parliamentary debate about these amendments in relation to CSA
allegations.153
What then has been the judicial interpretation of this new section? We argue
that the judicial comment to date has not given sufficient weight to the
significance of this amendment. For example, a number of decisions have
suggested it is not material whether s 60CC(2A) applies to a case, as
protection of a child from abuse must in any event take priority over
maintaining parental ties.154 Equally, in Tyler & Sullivan,155 Watts J
concluded, in the context of a case involving a CSA allegation against a
parent, that neither the 2006 nor the 2012 changes affected the test set out in
146 This was s 68F(2) at the time.
147 Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth).
148 FLA s 60CC(2). Subsequent case law has confirmed that the circumstances may be such that
additional considerations may outweigh primary considerations: see for example Mulvaney
& Lane (2009) FLC 93-404.
149 C Banks, B Batagol et al, ‘Review of the Exposure Draft of Family Law Amendment
(Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005’ (2005) 19 AJFL 79.
150 See B Fehlberg, B Smyth, M Maclean and C Roberts, Legislating for Shared Time Parenting
after Separation: A Research Review’ (2011) 25(3) Int Jnl of Law, Policy and the Family 318
at 327ff.
151 Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act (Cth) 2011.
The new provisions only apply to cases where the application was filed after 7 June 2012.
152 FLA, reading ss 60CC(2A) and 60CC(2)(b) together.
153 These can be found at <www.aph.gov.au>.
154 Crisp v Crisp [2012] FMCAfam 556; BC201204730 at [75]; Knightley v Brandon (2013)
272 FLR 332; [2013] FMCAfam 148; BC201300716 at [90]; Halston v Halston [2013]
FMCAfam 16; BC201300096 at [194]; Boccard v Boccard [2013] FamCA 63 at [3]; Gabel
& Meltzer [2014] FCCA 604; BC201403680 at [268].
155 [2014] FamCA 178; BC201451092 at [36].
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M v M.156 In Sawyer v Clancy (No 2),157 it was also assumed, though not in
the context of CSA, that the unacceptable risk test continues to apply post the
2012 amendments. However, notwithstanding s 60CC(2A), the judicial officer
said ‘[b]ecause the potential consequences of severing a worthwhile
relationship, between the child and one of his or her parents is potentially so
detrimental to the child concerned, the termination of such a relationship is in
most cases the last resort’.158 Much was made of the fact that this was an
interim decision, however, there is nothing in the legislation to indicate that
the approach is different for interim orders.
Concern over the judicial balancing of the two primary considerations was
instrumental in leading to this amendment and so it cannot be said that
s 60CC(2A) is simply codification of judicial practice; comments like that in
Sawyer highlight the danger of not giving s 60CC(2A) any substance. The test
in M v M hinges on the fact that there is a balancing process; prior to the
amendment, the balancing of the two primary considerations was a matter for
judicial discretion.159 The amendment makes clear that ‘the need to protect the
child’ must always be given greater weight than the other primary
consideration. Thus, the relative weighting of the considerations is now not a
judicial decision to be made based on the facts of a particular case, it is the
way the case must always be approached.160 Put bluntly, if the protection of
the child is in any way compromised to maintain parent/child contact, then the
most weight has not been given to protection from harm.
So, the amendment is not ‘neutral’ but that does not resolve the harder
question of how it affects the decision-making process. In considering the
general impact of this new formulation it has been said that protection from
violence and abuse must be given ‘priority over . . . the consideration of the
benefit of a meaningful relationship with both parents’161 and that ‘the child’s
right to a meaningful relationship with a parent is subservient to the need to
protect a child from physical or psychological harm’,162 In Ackerman v
Ackerman,163 Brown FM included in his analysis of this section reference to
the relevant passages of the Explanatory Memorandum:
71 The recent changes . . . regarding family violence, are significant
ones. The key amendments are designed to ‘prioritise the safety of
children in parenting matters’.
72 This does not mean that allegations of family violence are to be
uncritically accepted or anything other than closely scrutinised by the
156 See also Fulton & Packer [2013] FamCA 555 at [14] and Simpson & Hahn [2014] FamCA
674; BC201451436 at [62].
157 [2012] FMCAfam 1369.
158 Ibid, at [137].
159 See the discussion in Marsden v Winch (No 3) [2007] FamCA 1364; BC200750076
at [77]–[78].
160 Of course, this does not mean that in a given case the court will decide there is any ‘need
to protect the child’.
161 Lander v Bartling [2012] FMCAfam 1466; BC201210718 at [13].
162 Abney v Paris [2013] FMCAfam 7; BC201300110 at [192].
163 Ackerman v Ackerman [2013] FMCAfam 109; BC201300715; see also the earlier decision
by Brown FM in Labine & Labine [2012] FMCAfam 1398; BC201210771 at [108]–[110]
and the later decision by Brown J in Wetherill v Finchley [2013] FCCA 1197; BC201312684
at [142].
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court...Nor does it mean that the court must disregard the benefit of
a child having a meaningful level of relationship with both parents,
even in cases where there are concerns pertaining to family violence.
73 The rational for the amendments is to safeguard children from
coming to harm as a result of exposure to family violence. Section
60CC(2)(A) [sic] makes this the court’s priority, in cases where the
protection of children from harm, as a result of exposure to family
violence, abuse or neglect is germane.
74 In the words of the relevant explanatory memorandum ‘where child
safety is a concern, this new provision will provide the court with
clear legislative guidance that protecting the child from harm is the
priority consideration.’ Future protective issues for a child are the
court’s priority . . .
76 Both of these considerations remain important, but neither is
pre-eminent over the paramountcy principle . . . Although in
appropriate cases, child safety is to be given pre-eminence over
parental relationship, the best interests of the child concerned remain
the most important consideration arising from the statutory
framework. In my view, what was said by the Full Court in B v B
remains apposite:
• ‘Ultimately it is a question of applying in a common sense way
the individual section so as to achieve the best interests of the
children in a particular case.’
In their recent research on judicial responses to the 2012 amendments,
Strickland and Murray characterise Brown FM’s comments164 as confirming
violence does not act as some kind of ‘trump’ such that the benefit of
meaningful parent/child relationships can be ignored.165 However,
Brown FM’s interpretation arguably overlooks the significance of s 60B(1)(b)
which begins with the words ‘[t]he objects of this Part are to ensure that the
best interests of the child are met by . . .’ (emphasis added). This provides an
interpretative context which, when read with s 60CC(2A), might be said to
require that a court approaches matters on the basis that the child’s best
interests will be promoted, first and foremost, by protecting that child. Thus,
a child’s best interests are inextricably linked to, and cannot be divorced from,
its safety; we would caution against reverting to pre-amendment sentiments
about applying the sections in a ‘common sense’ way which may weaken the
very obvious intent, and specific wording, of this new provision.
In Elrasheed & McGrieve, Forrest J had this to say on the role of
s 60CC(2A):
Where [sexual abuse] is found to have occurred or to be occurring, then the weight
to be given to the need to protect a child or children from that abuse must,
necessarily, be greater than the weight given to the benefit to the child or children
of having a meaningful relationship with the parent who is the abuser . . .166
164 As expressed in Labine & Labine [2012] FMCAfam 1398; BC201210771 at [108]–[110].
165 Justice Strickland and K Murray, ‘A judicial perspective on the Australian family violence
reforms 12 months on’ (2014) 28 AJFL 47 at 70.
166 [2014] FamCA 11; BC201451263 at [123] (emphasis added).
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This formulation has the danger of limiting the application of the section,
which is not predicated on a finding of abuse. In this context, we note the
comment of Parkinson in discussing this new provision, that when there is a
case with ‘significant child protection issues’ (emphasis added) protection of
abuse should be prioritised.167 We would caution against adding any gloss to
the section; if, on the evidence, child protection is an issue, it must always be
prioritised.
Prior to 2006 there was a legislative reluctance to constrain judicial
discretion in relation to parenting orders; the fact of the creation of two tiers
of relevant considerations was therefore a significant legislative shift. As
Murphy J has noted, an allegation of CSA is relevant not only under the
primary considerations, but also many of the ‘additional considerations’;168
however, the fact that child safety is now a primary consideration is important
as a matter of statutory interpretation.169 Parliament has gone a step further
and said, of the two primary considerations, protection from harm must
always be given greater weight. If anything, this is a stronger legislative
imperative than the creation of the two tiers, given that prior to this
amendment the Full Court had accepted that, in the circumstances of a
particular case, more weight could be given to an additional consideration
than a primary consideration.170 This amendment puts protection from
violence and abuse in a special category as it were, as it surely follows from
s 60CC(2A) that the need to protect children must be given greater weight
than all additional considerations as well.171 In the words of the explanatory
memorandum noted above, it is now ‘the’ priority consideration; that is,
nothing can take priority over this consideration. Unlike Parkinson, we do not
consider that the introduction of s 60CC(2A) modifies the prior emphasis of
the provisions ‘only a little’.172
On this point, we note Parkinson’s argument that the primary and additional
considerations are different in kind, and so there is no hierarchy as such
between them.173 His position rests on the basis that the primary
considerations in essence reflect and emphasise two of the objects of Pt VII;
he argues the primary considerations are the destination and the additional
considerations provide the route. Objects and principles sections are
interpretive in function.174 While the primary considerations may reflect two
of the objects of Pt VII, there must logically be some substantive legal
167 P Parkinson, ‘The 2011 Family Violence Amendments: What difference will they make?’
(2012) 22(2) Australian Family Lawyer 1 at 11. Parkinson adopts the same terminology in
Parkinson, above n 142.
168 Carpenter v Carpenter (No 2) [2012] FamCA 1005; BC201250758 at [22]–[25].
169 In Marsden v Winch (No 3) [2007] FamCA 1364; BC200750076 the Full Court said at [78]
that particular emphasis must be placed on the primary considerations because they are
identified as such in the legislation.
170 Mulvany v Lane (2009) 41 Fam LR 418; (2009) FLC 93-404; [2009] FamCAFC 76;
BC200950209.
171 In this regard, we note the comments of Parkinson, above n 167, at 12.
172 Parkinson, above n 142, at 11.
173 P Parkinson, ‘Decision-making about the best interests of the child: The impact of the two
tiers’ (2006) 20 AJFL 179 at 184; Parkinson, above n 167, at 12.
174 See the recent Full Court decision to this effect: Maldera & Orbel (2014) 287 FLR 283;
[2014] FamCAFC 135 at [75].
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significance in making some considerations ‘primary’, over and above
emphasising the objects, which themselves are included to assist with the
interpretation of all of the substantive provisions. The mandated
considerations are simply that — considerations that must be taken into
account when exercising this discretion. They determine the evidence that
needs to be led in the case and now give some indication as to weight. By their
very nature the two tiers of considerations are not different in kind; if
anything, the fact of overlap between them argues against this (just as there
can be overlap between additional considerations).175 The categorisation of
these factors, however, provides direction as to the weight that might generally
be attached to the evidence that is led and this approach is evident in the
decision-making of the court. This approach is further supported by the
Explanatory Memorandum which says ‘[t]he intention of separating these
factors into two tiers is to elevate the importance of the primary factors . . .’
and which then goes on to talk about the weighting of primary versus
additional considerations.176 However, even if Parkinson’s interpretation were
correct, s 60CC(2A) has much to say about what the court’s destination should
be.
There has been some judicial recognition of the important impact of
s 60CC(2A). In Rivas & Stephen,177 Brown J had this to say:
as a consequence of all the factors outlined above, it may be impossible, for a court,
to determine definitively whether any abuse . . . has occurred . . . However, given the
structure of Part VII of the [FLA], particularly its emphasis on protecting children
from the consequences of any form of abuse, the court cannot disregard such
allegations or disregard their seriousness because of evidentiary difficulties, which
arise as a consequence of the court trying to establish the truth or otherwise of the
allegations . . .178
A position that accommodates what the Full Court has said to date about the
relationship of primary and additional considerations, and which incorporates
s 60CC(2A), would be as follows. In exercising its discretion, where there is
evidence of harm the court must:
• So far as is possible, make orders that seek to ensure the protection
of the child from harm in light of the evidence of harm.
• Of the remaining factors, generally place most weight on the benefit
to a child from having meaningful relationships with both parents but
may, where the facts require it, place as much, or more, weight on an
additional consideration, and
• Adopt the same approach whether the matter is an interim or final
hearing.179
A case recently decided, though not subject to s 60CC(2A), which adopts
this overall approach to the evidence before the court is Tree J’s decision in
175 Nor do we consider that because it may be useful to consider the additional considerations
first, that this necessarily supports Parkinson’s interpretation.
176 Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006 Explanatory
Memorandum, at 49–51, at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/
cth/bill_em/flaprb2006510/memo_0.html> (accessed 5 June 2014).
177 [2014] FCCA 2144; BC201408425.
178 Ibid, at [103]–[104].
179 See McAllister & Day [2012] FMCAfam 863; BC201210751 at [38] and [42].
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Lett & Lett.180 Here, the judge decided the evidence did not reach the required
standard for a finding of sexual abuse, but then made a clear, separate and
detailed assessment of the evidence of sexual abuse with a view to deciding
whether it was sufficiently strong to require protective measures be put in
place. Naturally, those two assessments looked at the evidence in different
ways:
Notwithstanding the grave nature of the finding and the consequences of doing so,
I am nonetheless satisfied to the requisite standard that the father is an unacceptable
risk of sexual harm to B. I so conclude principally because of the substantial
likelihood of abuse having occurred, and because of the fact that the disclosures are
consistent repeated behaviour, and because the impact of childhood sexual abuse is
potentially so severe and long lasting.181
This is not a decision based on a ‘lingering doubt’ but an assessment of the
true strength of the evidence of abuse, freed from any leaning toward a
conclusion that, having found the abuse couldn’t be proved, parental contact
should be given priority.
Thus, we argue the current legislative formulation creates a very clear
hierarchy for weighting considerations and the evidence led in relation
thereto. The first and pre-eminent question for the court is how to craft
parenting orders that protect the child in light of the evidence of physical or
psychological harm. The court cannot balance that against the benefit of
contact — to do so would mean that the most weight was not accorded to
protection from harm. Further, no additional consideration can outweigh the
protection of the child.182 The question for the decision-maker becomes: in
light of the evidence relevant to physical or psychological harm, am I satisfied
I have protected the child from future physical or psychological harm.
The impact of s 60CC(2A) on CSA cases
One effect of the operation of s 60CC(2A) must be that an approach to a CSA
case which treats false positives as equally concerning as false negatives will
now result in an appealable error. The words of the section are clear. As the
Family Court’s task is not to protect parental rights, the perceived problem of
a false negative can only (legitimately) be that it may deprive a child of a full
relationship with their parent. At the very least, therefore, this amendment can
be seen to make the point that the court is not permitted to approach CSA
cases with scepticism, on the ‘qui vive’ for false allegations and downplaying
the very real dangers of false negatives.
The next question is what impact, if any, this amendment has on the
unacceptable risk test (leaving aside for the moment the impact of s 60CG).
We have argued that, regardless of this amendment, there are cogent reasons
for abandoning this test. Section 60CC(2A) adds weight to that argument. The
test espoused in M v M rests on the notion of ‘balancing’ the risk of abuse
against the potential benefits of parent/child contact. As outlined above, this
180 [2014] FamCA 52; BC201451489.
181 Ibid, at [175].
182 So statements such as that in Tadic & Cupic [2013] FCWA 43 at [99] to the effect that both
primary considerations can be outweighed by additional considerations are no longer
permissible (it is not clear in that case if s 60CC(2A) in fact applied).
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balancing task is no longer ‘at large’ as it was when that case was decided; the
FLA now specifies how those competing considerations must be balanced.
This arguably undermines the basis of the test as set out in M v M.
So, in the hard CSA cases, the question now demanded of the court is no
more, or less, than this: given the evidence of abuse, what orders will best
protect this child from being exposed or subjected to abuse in the future? The
court must be satisfied, in making its orders, that it has so protected the child.
This may seem a subtle shift, but we would argue it is an important one that
has the potential to affect outcomes by shifting attention away from a ‘finding’
as to unacceptable risk or otherwise. This may very well be a more difficult
decision to make than applying the unacceptable risk test. However, the
required legislative process cannot be simplified by attaching to the proof of
abuse such significance that it ultimately becomes the determinant of what
orders are made. Rather, the court must take the evidence it has, give greatest
weight to the evidence that indicates the child needs protection from abuse and
if appropriate, frame orders with a view to protecting the child from abuse;
then, if possible and appropriate, the court must try to ensure any benefit to the
child through a relationship with the parent is preserved. However, if that is
not possible, then protection from harm takes precedence.
In N v S, Fogarty J said:
Thus, the essential importance of the unacceptable risk question as I see it is in its
direction to judges to give real and substantial consideration to the facts of the case,
and to decide whether or not, and why or why not, those facts could be said to raise
an unacceptable risk of harm to the child. Thus, the value of the expression is not
in a magical provision of an appropriate standard, but in its direction to judges to
consider deeply where the facts of the particular case fall, and to explain adequately
their findings in this regard.183
That sentiment is not wholly inconsistent with what we are proposing,
however, it possibly underestimates the dangers of the test, which his Honour
has articulated elsewhere;184 moreover, in light of s 60CC(2A) there is new
direction as to the weight to be given to those crucial facts.
As the High Court all but predicted, by attempting to capture what is
required in a ‘test’ the court has striven ‘for a greater degree of definition than
the subject is capable of yielding’. No test is required in the first place.
Further, s 60CC(2A) mandates a different process of decision-making and
reinforces the inappropriateness of an unacceptable risk test.
Finally, how does s 60CG sit with this analysis? If that section gives
statutory force to this test then that creates a rather confusing situation. If it is
the case that this section was intended to apply to those other than the relevant
child(ren), then the section should be reframed in that way. However, this
raises an important issue: why would we afford any lesser priority to the
protection of third parties from abuse than children? That is, should the
protection from harm of all relevant persons be included in s 60CC(2A) and
if that were done how would that sit with the paramountcy principle? This is
183 N and S and the Separate Representative (1996) FLC 92-655; (1995) 19 FamLR 837
at [138].
184 Fogarty, above n 9.
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a very important question185 beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say,
our analysis above would suggest that s 60CG should be amended to clarify
its application and to eliminate any reference to ‘unacceptable’ risk.
Where to from here?
No doubt the first instinct of many will be to assume this article is arguing in
favour of more readily suspending contact with fathers against whom
allegations of CSA are made. However, that is not the case. First, we do not
take the view that all children abused by a parent are better off having no
contact with their abuser. Some abused children may welcome and benefit
from being raised in an environment in which they can be safe and have a
relationship with both of their parents. Nor do we assume that the hard cases
necessarily involve abuse of a child by a parent. However, the seriousness of
this matter, the hysteria it seems to generate, the myths that still gain traction
in the ongoing debate and the no doubt traumatising effect of going to trial in
these cases, all suggest something needs to change.
All of these cases involve families suffering from dysfunction. One option,
as recently discussed by Faulks J,186 is an alternative decision-making body.
As his Honour rightly points out, proposals of this kind do not address a range
of difficulties that would still exist precisely because, at the end of the day, the
family is subjected to a decision-making process. However, his Honour
concludes by saying ‘in the end, it is about justice’.187 In fact, it is all about
finding a way forward for these families that protects children and furthers
their interests without discounting the rights and interests of other family
members. A more fruitful solution, we suggest, would lie in thinking further
about special case management and diversion of these cases, beyond that
which is already offered,188 to reduce the number of cases that end up at trial
and to expedite those that do. If we could resist the appeal of the adversarial
and move to a truly different model, there is the potential to provide much
better solutions for these families, expensive though that may be. Like
Parkinson, we lament the approach of government which focuses on
amendment to the FLA to solve problems, rather than putting more resources
into support processes and services for affected families.189
But some cases will proceed to a determination, and pre-trial processes
need to be supported by a judicial decision-making climate that focusses first
on child protection, not shared parenting. Abandoning the unacceptable risk
test may make decision-making harder. While there are dangers in adopting an
inappropriate test for resolving these disputes, we do not suggest that
rectifying this judicial process will ‘solve’ the problems these families are
facing, but it may result in more children being protected from sexual abuse.
185 See R Chisholm, ‘How to treat allegations of violence and abuse: Amador v Amador’ (2010)
24 AJFL 276 where the broader question of whether there is any difference in approach
required in relation to the making of findings of abuse against adults and children is
considered and the discussion in Fehlberg, above n 19, at [8.4.1.3.5].
186 Faulks, above n 19.
187 Ibid, at 165.
188 We have not discussed the Magellan pathway for these cases; for discussion of that process,
see Fryer, above n 33.
189 Parkinson, above n 167, at 1.
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Further, it may help focus pre-trial negotiations on assessing the evidence of
abuse and focusing on how a protective parenting arrangement can be
structured through agreement, rather than driving towards a court battle to try
and resolve the question of the fact of the abuse.
We particularly caution against the ongoing rhetoric that ‘the problem’ in
this area is false allegations, not protection of children from abuse; this
unjustified fear has the potential to distort decision-making. Section
60CC(2A) demands that decision-makers put first and foremost the protection
of children. This is the court’s remit. If the court is presently well placed to
deal with anything, it is false allegations of sexual abuse. There is little
evidence it is well placed to protect children from abuse; this is an intransigent
problem societally. If a matter cannot be resolved and proceeds to a
determination, the court must fulfil its obligations under the statutory regime
and be wary of super-imposed ‘tests’ that undermine that role, however
intuitively attractive they may seem.
Finally, it is vitally important that research be undertaken in this area, to
inform decisions about how best to move forward. The sensitive nature of this
topic may be part of the reason for the paucity of pertinent data, but given the
prevalence of CSA, its serious consequences for victims and the consequences
for all concerned where allegations are fabricated or misunderstood, it is
imperative that myths are dispelled and some baseline data is obtained, which
would both inform the development, and permit evaluation of, much needed
reforms. While Magellan has been evaluated from a process point of view, we
know nothing of what becomes of these families. Family law is one legal area
where we have embraced the value of research data; for the sake of these
families we need to turn our gaze to this difficult area.
Child sexual abuse allegations and s 60CC(2A): A new era? 265
